

CONFIDENTIAL

8 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, DDI Management Staff

ATTENTION : DDI Security Officer

SUBJECT : Policy Statement on Disclosure and Reproduction of
Intelligence Originated in Another USIB Agency

1. This memorandum requests, again, that the proper authority affirm in writing that CRS is not subject to so much of paragraph 4b of DCID 1/7, 5 October 1975, as reads:

Classified foreign intelligence documents, even though they bear no control markings, will not be released in their original form to third agencies...without permission of the originator.

2. This statement or a statement like it has appeared in previous versions of DCID 1/7. However, on 25 August 1959, USIB-D-39.4/1 eased policy to permit an agency to do retrospective search and supply of documents for a third agency. Other easements of DCID 1/7 were also provided in the 1959 paper to facilitate document processing of a second or third agency's materials. The 1959 agreements have been presumed to remain in force since then and, indeed, the briefings to various parts of the DDI by the CIA member of the USIB Security Committee were marked by statements that such easements were to continue in effect because the purpose of the 1975 revision of DCID 1/7 was primarily to ease the third-agency rule.

3. Under the presumed continuation of the 1959 agreements, CRS regularly conducts retrospective searches of positive foreign intelligence reports in support of work being done by various members of USIB. CRS has extensive holdings of material in library document files, biographic files and installation files. It is quite common for CRS, in response to specific requests, to provide NSA documents to State, State documents to DoD elements, DoD documents to NSA and everybody's document to such military commands as SAC. Dissemination controls, of course, are respected in this process. This is a useful function; the alternative is for SAC, or whoever, to query each member of USIB for material relative to a specific topic on a retrospective search. But, not all members of USIB can do such retrospective searches. The words in the newly revised DCID 1/7, however, seem to require an end to the service by CRS to the Community unless the 1959 easements are continued.

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4. In response to my query concerning the continuing validity of the 1959 easements, B. A. Lowe, Secretary to USIB, forwarded to me a 1 October 1975 memorandum prepared by D. E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee. This memorandum talks around the point. It does not say that the 1959 easements remain valid. Instead, ignoring the language quoted in paragraph 1 above (paragraph 4b of the revised DCID), Moore refers to paragraph 3d and the footnote thereto which concerns the implication of "WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED."

5. I shall accept the 1 October 1975 Moore memorandum as certification that the 1959 easements permit CRS to continue to retrospective search and document recovery for members of the Community but only until 1 January 1976. In the interim, I request such action as is necessary to reaffirm the continued validity of the 1959 easements without which I believe that CRS should cease to provide library and retrieval services involving third agency materials. Such action would be somewhat silly, but the times suggest that I should abide by all of the rules.


H. C. EISENBEISS
Director, Central Reference Service

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Attachments:

- A - DCID 1/7, 5 Oct 75
- B - C/Security Committee memo to ExSec, USIB, 1 Oct 75
- C - USIB-D-39.4/1, 25 Aug 75, CONFIDENTIAL

Distribution:

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 - 1 - DDI Security Officer
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